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Abstract 
Theory of Mind (ToM) is a neurocognitive system that allows the perceiver to attribute mental 
states, such as intentions, beliefs, or feelings, to others’ actions. The aim of the present work is to 
analyse the engagement of the ToM system in communication, in particular, in communicative 
intention processing. To this aim, we propose an Intention Processing Network (IPN) with its own 
principles and mechanisms, that is, a brain network differentially engaged according to the complex 
intertwining of the context, goal, and action involved. According to our IPN model, a set of brain 
regions of the ToM system (i.e. left and right temporoparietal junction, precuneus, and medial 
prefrontal cortex) are differentially involved in comprehending different types of intention, such as 
private or social intentions. We provide independent and convergent evidence on the role of the IPN 
model in communicative intention processing and we show that the engagement of the IPN does not 
depend upon the communicative means used, that is, written language, auditory language, or 
gesture. Evidence deriving from different experimental paradigms, including neuroimaging, lesion, 
neurodegenerative, and brain stimulation studies are discussed. In our view, this evidence 
establishes a link between ToM and pragmatics studies and suggests the role of intention processing 
as a core feature of human communication. 
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List of abbreviations:  
 
bvFTD = Behavioral variant of frontotemporal dementia; 
fMRI = functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging; 
IFG = Inferior frontal gyrus; 
IPN = Intention processing network;  
MNS = Mirror neuron system;  
MPFC = Medial prefrontal cortex;  
pSTS = posterior superior temporal sulcus; 
rTMS = repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation; 
tDCS = transcranial Direct Current Stimulation;  
ToM = Theory of Mind;  
TPJ = Temporoparietal junctions. 
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Introduction 
Social life rests on the ability to understand other people’s actions, in particular, their reasons for 
behaving as they do, and what they are likely to do next. However, most actions are just observable 
consequences of unobservable internal mental states, such as individual goals or intentions, as well 
as beliefs or desires. In the last two decades, students in social cognitive neuroscience have focused 
on the neural correlates of the human ability to make sense of others’ social actions. Three 
neurocognitive systems play a pivotal role in social information processing: the social perception, 
action observation, and Theory of Mind (ToM) systems (Arioli and Canessa 2019; Quadflieg and 
Koldewyn 2017; Yang et al. 2015). The social perception system allows the perceiver to detect, 
encode, and analyse others’ external behavioural signals to manage the complex information that 
constitutes a person’s distinctive social appearance. This neurocognitive system mainly involves the 
occipital and fusiform face and body areas, along with the posterior superior temporal sulcus 
(pSTS), a region sensitive to dynamic facial and bodily input. The action observation system is 
dedicated to motor and action understanding, primarily embracing the perceiver’s self, that is, it 
requires perceivers to go beyond merely decoding others’ external signals to match observed 
actions to their own actions. This neurocognitive system mostly overlaps with the mirror neuron 
system (MNS) and involves the inferior parietal lobule, the ventral premotor cortex, and the inferior 
frontal gyrus (IFG), a region relevant to motor control and language processing. Finally, to 
comprehend and predict others’ behaviours, the ToM system allows the perceiver to attribute mental 
states, such as intentions, beliefs, or feelings, to others’ actions, primarily involving the medial 
prefrontal cortex (MPFC), the temporoparietal junctions (TPJ), and the precuneus (Abu-Akel and 
Shamay-Tsoory 2011; Schurz et al. 2014).  
In recent years, the ToM system has attracted great attention within the social cognitive 
neuroscience domain, in particular for its role in intention processing, as it responds to the why of a 
social action in a particular context, especially when integration of complex contextual information 
is required for intention attribution (Spunt et al. 2011; Van Overwalle and Baetens 2009). The 
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present paper focuses on the role of the ToM system in the elaboration of a particular kind of social 
action, that is, communicative action. In the last decade, we have performed a series of 
neuroimaging studies investigating the role of the ToM system in different social and non-social 
contexts. The aim of the present work is to analyse the engagement of the ToM neurocognitive 
system in communication, in particular, in processing communicative intention. We shall first 
examine the role of intention processing in the comprehension of general action and then of 
communicative action; we propose an intention processing brain network able to discriminate 
between social and non-social contexts and between future and present communicative intentions. 
Our aim is to clarify the crucial intersection between cognitive intrapersonal brain activity and the 
most important interpersonal domain, that is, communication.  
 
Intention processing for general and communicative action 
Intention processing of observed actions requires different attribution processes, such as agent 
attribution (who), which allow the attribution of an intention to its author; motor or action intention 
attribution (what or how), which enable identification of the motor intention from the observation of 
an action; and goal-representation (why), which permits the identification of the goal of an intended 
action within a specific context (Becchio et al. 2006; Spunt et al. 2010). These attribution processes 
roughly correspond to the neurocognitive systems previously described, in particular, the attribution 
of what plays a critical role in the social perception system, and the attribution of how plays a 
critical role in the action observation system. The attribution of why, in particular, understanding of 
the why vs. the how of action, is a social cognitive process that has recently been the subject of 
interesting research in social neuroscience (Spunt and Adolphs 2014). This ‘pragmatic’ approach to 
action understanding focuses on the role of ToM processing in intention attribution, as it represents 
what Frith and Frith (2006) called ‘what happens next’ in a social setting.  
The pragmatic approach to action understanding is well represented by the works of Spunt 
and colleagues (Spunt et al. 2016), according to which the neural system recruited when people 
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understand others’ actions depends on whether they are considering how or why the action is being 
performed. Although identifying how actions are being performed engages activity in premotor 
areas, identifying why actions are being performed mainly involves the brain regions of the ToM 
system (i.e. the MPFC, TPJ, and precuneus). In a seminal functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) work using naturalistic videos of ordinary human actions, Spunt et al. (2011) induced three 
levels of action identification by instructing participants to describe what the character is doing 
(intermediate level, e.g. reading a book), how he is doing it (low level, e.g. flipping pages), or why 
he is doing it (high level, e.g. obtaining knowledge). As the level of identification increased, the 
demand on mental state inference also increased and, in turn, the activation of the brain areas of the 
ToM system; on the contrary, no significant increase in MNS activity (namely, the action 
observation system) was found. In a further study, Spunt et al. (2016) tested if the same action (e.g. 
‘make a phone call’) could be represented at different levels and directions of abstraction, such as 
from how to why and vice versa: the higher level (from how to why) specifies the abstract intention 
that explains why the action is performed (e.g. ‘contact a friend’ or more abstract ‘feel connected’), 
while the lower level (from why to how) specifies the concrete stages that indicate how the action is 
performed (e.g. ‘dial numbers’). These authors found that conceptualizing actions by increasing the 
level of abstraction specifically recruited the ToM system. On the contrary, decreasing the level of 
abstraction did not recruit ToM brain regions but a broader network, including MNS core regions, 
which enable representation of the visual and somatomotor features of actions. Similarly, Van 
Overwalle (2009) and Van Overwalle and Baetens (2009) discussed which brain areas are 
responsible for understanding the actions of others and their underlying goals. These authors 
proposed a model in which actions and goals are organized hierarchically according to the level of 
abstractness, and that distinguishes between immediate goals that reflect the understanding of basic 
actions and long-term intentions that reflect the why of an action in a social context. 
We adopt the why vs. the what/how distinction in the comprehension of social actions, 
applying it to the particular case of communicative actions, where it could guide the reconstruction 
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of the reasons underlying the realization of a communicative intention. As we will discuss, this 
approach could be considered a cognition/pragmatics interface that links the why of action to the 
why of communicative action. 
 
Intention processing and communication 
Following Grice’s proposals (Grice 1957, 1975), pragmatic theories of communication claim that 
human communication ability is specialized for the expression, recognition, and reconstruction of 
intentions via communicative actions, independently of the linguistic or extralinguistic modalities 
used to convey those intentions (Bara 2010). Accordingly, communication is a social action used to 
affect and modify the mental states of others, and communicative intention is the primary mental 
state involved in explaining other people’s communicative actions. Philosophy of language and 
Cognitive Pragmatics define communicative intention as the intention to communicate a meaning to 
someone else, plus the intention that the former intention should be recognized by the addressee 
(Airenti et al. 1993; Bara 2010; Grice 1975). 
Different authors argue that communicative intention processing does not simply consist in 
applying general ToM abilities to a particular communicative behaviour; rather, it involves a 
dedicated intention processing network, with its own principles and mechanisms (Bara et al. 2016). 
According to Sperber and Wilson (2002), the problem of applying a general procedure for inferring 
intentions from actions to the special case of inferring communicative intentions from 
communicative actions is that communicative intentions typically carry a vastly greater amount of 
information than more ordinary motor intentions. ‘Quite simply, we can say so much more we can 
do’ (Sperber and Wilson 2002, p.11). Hence, to describe the neural correlates of the pragmatic 
comprehension of communicative intentions, it is mandatory to explore which and how brain 
regions of ToM processing are engaged. 
 
The Intention Processing Network 
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Action understanding requires inferential and mental attribution processes that assign a goal to 
action by evaluating its efficiency as a mean of obtaining the goal within specific context 
constraints (Brass et al. 2007). Within a social cognitive neuroscientific perspective, in recent years, 
we have performed a series of neuroimaging studies which led to the proposal of the Intention 
Processing Network (IPN) model. According to our model, a subset of regions of the ToM system 
is differentially involved in comprehending different types of intention, such as private or social 
intentions (Bara et al. 2016). The IPN model introduces a theoretical distinction that differentiates 
the social involvement of agents, namely private versus social dimensions of intention, and the 
temporal dimension, namely, the present or prospective dimensions of social interaction. Whereas 
private intentions only involve the actor satisfying a particular goal (e.g. grabbing a bottle of water 
to quench thirst), in social intentions, conversely, the goal of the actor is satisfied only if at least one 
other person is involved. Additionally, we can distinguish a temporal dimension of social intentions 
that are shared in present or prospective (future) interactions. When two agents interact, the social 
intention is shared in the present (e.g. asking a traffic policeman for directions), such as in 
communicative intention. When a given social interaction is not present at the moment but the 
action of a single agent leads to it, the social intention is potentially shared in the future (e.g. buying 
a Christmas present for a friend). We define this type of social intention as prospective social 
intention (Bara 2011). 
In a set of fMRI studies (Bara et al. 2011; Ciaramidaro et al. 2007; Walter et al. 2004; 
Walter et al. 2009), we used a story completion task presented in a comic strip form to show the 
differential recruitment of the ToM network according to the IPN model described. The stories 
depicted one or two characters that were involved in private versus social situations, and required 
participants to represent private intentions based on observations of a character’s isolated actions 
(e.g., observing a single person changing a broken bulb in order to read a book); prospective social 
intentions based on observations of a character’s isolated actions aimed to interact with someone 
else in the future (e.g., observing a single person preparing a romantic dinner for another person 
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who was not present in the scenario); communicative intentions based on observations of two 
characters interacting (e.g., observing a person obtaining a glass of water by asking another person 
to get it for her); and finally, non-intentional causal links among objects, namely, a physical 
causality control condition (e.g., a ball blown by a gust of wind knocking over a glass of water and 
breaking it). 
The brain areas associated with the IPN included different fundamental regions engaged by 
ToM processing, namely the MPFC and precuneus, along with the bilateral pSTS and adjacent TPJ, 
brain areas referred to collectively as the TPJ in this work, for simplicity, although see Gobbini et 
al. (2007) and Saxe (2006) for a specific dissociation of these regions. The IPN model showed that 
the entire network was only activated during communicative intention processing when two 
characters were depicted in a communicative interaction. In contrast, the activated network was 
limited to posterior brain areas (i.e. the right TPJ and precuneus) when the character was acting 
according to a private intention. For prospective social intentions, our data showed that the 
recruitment of the right TPJ and precuneus does not suffice when an agent is manifesting a social 
intention to be shared in the future; in this case, recruitment of the MPFC is also necessary. Because 
of this pattern of activation, we define the IPN model as the progressive recruitment of the four key 
regions associated with ToM processing according to the different intentions involved: specifically, 
the precuneus and right TPJ for private intentions, the precuneus, right TPJ, plus the MPFC for 
prospective social intentions, and finally the precuneus, right TPJ, MPFC, plus the left TPJ for 
communicative intentions (Figure 1). Finally, it is important to note that the IPN showed no 
complete anatomo-functional overlap with the brain regions of the ToM system: for example, the 
IPN does not include the amygdala, the orbitofrontal regions, or the temporal pole that are mainly 
involved in affective ToM, that is, the ability to process other people’s emotions and feelings (see 
Abu-Akel and Shamay-Tsoory 2011; Carrington and Bailey 2009). 
 
------------------------- 
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Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------- 
 
Since Cognitive Pragmatics proposes that a communicative intention should be recognized by the 
addressee regardless of the communicative means used to convey it (Bara 2011), in two further 
fMRI studies (Enrici et al. 2011; Tettamanti et al. 2017) we specifically investigated whether the 
same communicative intention conveyed by language or gesture engages similar or different brain 
regions of the IPN, with the working hypothesis of a strong overlap between the two modalities. In 
the first neuroimaging study (Enrici et al. 2011), we adopted a modified version of the story 
completion task previously used, representing communicative intentions in either linguistic 
modality (simple and direct communication acts in written form) or gestural modality (depicted 
conventional ideational gestures, particularly emblem gestures). We compared these intentional 
conditions with two non-intentional control conditions (physical causality established among 
objects) (see Figure 2). Findings agreed with the Cognitive Pragmatics prediction as they revealed 
that the same pattern of brain areas belonging to the IPN was recruited for the comprehension of 
communicative intention, independently of the linguistic or gestural modality through which it was 
conveyed. Additional brain areas, outside those involved in intention processing, were specifically 
engaged in accordance with the particular communicative modality. Specifically, the linguistic 
modality recruited the perisylvian language network, including the pars opercularis of the left IFG. 
By contrast, the gestural modality recruited a sensorimotor network, including the pars opercularis 
of the right IFG. Based on these results, we suggested a modality-specific gateway hypothesis 
according to which the left and right IFG reflect modality-specific input gateways, conveying 
stimuli and associated high-order information to the IPN (Figure 2). 
 
------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
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------------------------- 
 
In a second connectivity study (Tettamanti et al. 2017), we tested the modality-specific gateway 
hypothesis by using dynamic causal modelling to measure inter-regional functional integration 
dynamics between the IPN and left/right IFG gateways. We found strong evidence of a well-defined 
effective connectivity architecture mediating functional integration between the IPN and inferior 
frontal cortices. The analysis indicates a modality-specific propagation of information from the left 
IFG to the IPN for the linguistic modality, and from the right IFG to the IPN for the gestural 
modality. The findings corroborate the hypothesis that the left and right IFG represent modality-
specific gateways that allow linguistic and gestural stimuli information, respectively, to be 
integrated into communicative intentions elaborated through the IPN (Figure 3).  
 
------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
------------------------- 
 
Taken together, these fMRI studies describe a well-defined set of brain regions, prominently 
associated with ToM processing, that form a network with its own principles and mechanisms, 
recruited for intention processing. The IPN model we proposed showed, first, that different brain 
areas associated with ToM processing are specifically involved in communicative contexts, in 
particular in the attribution of communicative intentions. Second, we showed that, in terms of ToM 
engagement, communicative intention processing is independent of the expressive modality through 
which communicative intentions are conveyed. Finally, we reported that two additional neural 
gateways in the inferior frontal cortices, regions mainly associated with the action observation 
system, are recruited by the modality through which communicative intentions are conveyed. 
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It is important to note that tasks assessing different cognitive functions outside 
communication, in both social and non-social domains, show the involvement of all or part of the 
ToM brain areas included in the IPN model (see for example Spreng et al. 2009). In particular, the 
MPFC has been interpreted in terms of different functional roles, either domain-specific or domain-
general (Bzdok et al. 2013; Hartwright et al. 2014). For example, Gilbert et al. (2006; 2007) found 
that different regions of the rostral MPFC are differentially associated with social and non-social 
functions, such as attention and multiple task coordination, and episodic memory. Nonetheless, it is 
equally important to stress that the ToM brain areas included in the IPN model do not encompass a 
general reasoning network, that is, reasoning processes of both social and non-social entities. 
According to Van Overwalle (2011), there are many differences in the involvement of the ToM 
brain areas between social and non-social reasoning tasks. In particular, the MPFC is recruited 
much less often when the experimental stimuli do not involve ToM about human actions or mental 
traits. There is a decreased likelihood of MPFC activation when reasoning stimuli contain limited 
social intention processing. Van Overwalle (2011) suggested that claims of a common network for 
general and social reasoning are probably due to anatomical confounds between ToM core regions 
and other nearby brain areas. Although this evidence would allow for an even stronger claim, we 
prefer a more cautious position and thus do not claim that the individual ToM brain areas included 
in the IPN model are necessarily engaged only during intention processing; instead, we claim that, 
as a whole, these areas form a dedicated neurocognitive system with its own principles and 
mechanisms allowing intention processing in communication. 
In the following paragraphs, we provide independent and convergent evidence on the role of 
ToM brain areas of the IPN model in communicative intention processing. We will discuss 
evidence deriving from different experimental paradigms, including neuroimaging, lesion, 
neurodegenerative, and brain stimulation studies. 
  
Independent neuroimaging evidence for the IPN model 
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Important independent evidence on the role of ToM brain areas in communication comes from three 
related domains of neuroimaging research, such as studies on narrative and pragmatics processing, 
and studies using pseudo or real interactive paradigms. 
 
Narrative processing 
Stories are used extensively for human communication, and both the comprehension and production 
of oral and written narratives constitute a fundamental part of our experience, both interpersonal 
and intrapersonal. Mar (2004, 2011) has demonstrated that ToM processing and narrative 
comprehension of both written and auditory stories engage similar neurocognitive processes (see 
also Yuan et al. 2018 for production storytelling). The brain network involved in stories and 
narrative comprehension overlaps with both brain regions associated with story-based ToM studies, 
that is, studies that have investigated ToM using written stories, and with non-story-based ToM 
studies, that is, studies that have investigated ToM abilities via observed behaviours. The 
overlapping regions include different ToM areas of the IPN model, such as the bilateral MPFC, and 
the pSTS/TPJ, along with the left IFG, associated with linguistic processing. Accordingly, similar 
processes are involved in understanding the mental states of both real and fictional others (e.g. 
characters in a novel or a film) described in both written and auditory forms (Mar and Oatley 2008; 
Oatley 2016). Consistent with this idea, different authors have demonstrated that lifetime exposure 
to narrative fiction is positively associated with social abilities (e.g., Mar et al. 2006), and that 
fiction reading leads to a small but statistically significant improvement in social cognitive 
performance, in particular in ToM tasks (Kidd and Castano 2013), compared to non-fiction reading 
or no reading (Dodell-Feder and Tamir 2018). 
Overall, this evidence is important for two reasons: first, the ToM brain areas associated 
with communicative intention processing are commonly involved in both observed behaviours and 
written stories scenarios; thus, not only by the direct observation of others’ behaviours but also by 
the narration of others’ behaviours. Second, this represents further evidence of the independence 
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between the ToM system and processes associated with the specific communication means or 
narrative form used to describe a communicative action, that is, a written text or auditory story as 
well as observed actions. 
 
Pragmatic processing 
Significant independent evidence on the role of ToM brain areas in communication comes from 
neuroimaging studies on non-standard communication, that is, pragmatics phenomena in which the 
intended and the literal meaning do not correspond.  
Irony comprehension is one of the most investigated pragmatics phenomena that requires 
inference processes to comprehend the speaker’s meaning, starting from the literal meaning, and in 
which the communicative intention often corresponds to the opposite of the literal meaning. Shibata 
et al. (2010) reported specific activation in the right MPFC, left precuneus, left STS, and right 
precentral gyrus in the understanding of ironic vs. literal sentences. Similarly, Spotorno et al. (2012) 
compared participants’ comprehension of brief stories in which a target sentence (e.g. ‘Tonight we 
gave a superb performance’) was made either ironically or literally, depending on the context in 
which it was expressed (e.g. a terrible performance in the ironic condition and an impressive 
performance in the literal condition). Their findings showed that all the ToM brain areas of the IPN 
model were active when participants understood verbal irony, suggesting a strong relationship 
between irony comprehension and ToM processing. 
Another pragmatic phenomenon that presents a gap between the intended and the literal 
meaning is metaphor comprehension. Prat et al. (2012) manipulated figurativeness in metaphor 
comprehension using three figurative conditions of increasing difficulty and showed right TPJ and 
superior medial frontal activation for all figurative conditions compared with a literal condition. 
Moreover, a volumetric analysis showed that these regions were sensitive to figurativeness and not 
to difficulty manipulations. These authors suggested that these areas respond to the increased social 
processing demands of the figurative conditions, as in these conditions, ‘insights into the intentions 
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(or theory of mind) of the protagonist were relevant for comprehending the critical utterance’ (Prat 
et al. 2012, p. 290).  
Activation of both the MPFC and right TPJ were also found in comprehension of indirect 
speech acts, in which a pragmatic inference was necessary as the speaker’s meaning was implicit 
(Basnakova et al. 2014). Compared with direct control utterances, in which the speaker’s meaning 
was explicitly stated and corresponded to the literal meaning, the comprehension of indirect speech 
acts engages a set of brain areas mainly including the MPFC and right TPJ. The involvement of all 
the IPN nodes was found by van Ackeren et al. (2012) in the understanding of indirect speech acts. 
Comparing the brain activation underlying the comprehension of the same utterance such as ‘It is 
very hot here’ used as an indirect request to open a window or as a direct speech act in the context 
of a desert scene, these authors found significant left and right TPJ, precuneus, and MPFC 
activation, which strongly overlapped with the IPN. 
 The comprehension of implicated meanings in everyday conversations was investigated by 
Jang et al. (2013). These authors analysed, in particular, the comprehension of conversational 
implicatures, specifically focusing on the implicature in which the maxim of relevance is violated. 
Participants underwent an fMRI task with a series of conversational pairs, each consisting of a 
question (e.g. ‘Is Dr. Smith in his office now?’) and an answer, including explicit answers (e.g. ‘Dr. 
Smith is in his office now’), moderately implicit answers (e.g. ‘Dr. Smith’s car is parked outside the 
building’), and highly implicit answers (e.g. ‘The black car is parked outside the building’). Results 
showed that the comprehension of highly implicit answers increased activation of the left MPFC, 
left posterior cingulate cortex, and right anterior temporal lobe, along with the left IFG. Jang et al. 
(2013) suggested that the involvement of the MPFC and precuneus can be attributed to the ToM 
processes necessary to build coherence between literally irrelevant but pragmatically relevant 
utterances.  
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Overall, this evidence showed that the ToM brain regions included in the IPN model are 
crucially engaged in pragmatic phenomena when communicative intention has to be reconstructed 
starting with discrepancies between intended and literal meaning. 
 
One-sided interaction: communicative production vs. comprehension processing 
Communicative exchange requires the construction of an acceptable interpretation of the reciprocal 
communicative actions at all levels that participants consider significant (Bara 2010). Although we 
can consider a single agent when we refer to intention attribution to actions in general, we should 
always refer to at least one actor and a partner to whom the act is directed in the domain of intention 
attribution in communication (Bara et al. 2016). The meaning of a communicative exchange 
emerges then from the mutual interplay of interactive agents embedded in a specific context 
(Adenzato and Bucciarelli 2008; Adenzato and Garbarini 2006; Vicari and Adenzato 2014).  
Few neuroimaging studies have examined full communicative exchanges that include the act 
proposed by an actor and the concurrent reaction of a partner. The majority of studies, including our 
previous works, almost exclusively analysed communicative comprehension, that is, when the 
communicative intention has to be reconstructed by the addressee. Most communicative 
comprehension studies have focused their analysis on processes that take place outside a 
communicative exchange or on early phases of communicative interaction. For example, some 
neuroimaging studies examined comprehension of early signals that convey an intention to 
communicate or attempt to initiate a communicative interaction, such as pointing a finger directly at 
the subject, looking directly at someone, or calling their name (Kampe et al. 2003; Materna et al. 
2008). Other studies asked subjects to passively observe communicative actions performed by a 
single actor, for example, a gesture directed toward someone or placing a cup in front of them 
(Andric et al., 2013; Tylen, Allen, Hunter, & Roepstorff, 2012; but see also Arioli et al., 2018; 
Canessa et al., 2012). Finally, an interesting study examined the perception of being personally 
addressed in a communicative exchange matching the same communicative intention (e.g. ‘I’m 
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cold. Are you?’) expressed by linguistic vs. gestural modalities, and showed shared processing of 
gesture and language (Redcay et al. 2016). In these studies, different ToM brain areas included in 
the IPN (such as the MPFC, TPJ, or pSTS)—but not necessarily the whole network—were recruited 
according to the kind of signal used to elicit a communicative interaction. It is important to 
underscore that within these experimental situations a communicative exchange between agents is 
merely put forward by the actor or character, but does not actually take place. 
Other studies on communicative comprehension used interactive paradigms with a one-sided 
interaction situation, that is, without a concurrent reaction from a partner (Gallagher et al. 2002; 
Kircher et al. 2009; McCabe et al. 2001). In these works, the interaction was mediated by a game 
interaction, for example, cooperative or competitive games in which participants were directly 
involved in social interaction, but without a real communicative exchange. Results of these studies 
reported activation of brain areas of the ToM system, such as the MPFC and right TPJ, in particular 
when participants were playing, or thought they were playing, with a human counterpart rather than 
with a computer. 
Very few studies have investigated communicative production, that is, when the 
communicative intention is formed by the agent to communicate, using real interactive situations 
where a full communicative exchange was presented. Most studies that have examined 
communicative production processing again used a one-sided interaction. For example, Calarge et 
al. (2003) proposed an imaginative communicative scenario that required participants to invent and 
say aloud stories describing imaginary encounters with strangers. The results showed that compared 
with a control condition in which participants read aloud stories requiring no mental state 
attribution, the imaginative communicative scenario was associated with ToM brain activations 
quite similar to those of the IPN.  
One of the first fMRI studies that used a linguistic interaction paradigm, even though one-
sided, is probably the work by Sassa et al. (2007). Using short video clips of daily actions in which 
an actor used a tool or handled an object and glanced at the camera, participants were required to 
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respond to clips by talking to the person on the screen in a casual communicative manner 
(communicative condition) or verbally described the actor’s situation (descriptive condition). Both 
conditions involved speech production, but only the communicative condition required a specific 
and explicit communicative intent directed to the actor. Accordingly, only communicative trials 
showed increased activation in the MPFC, and bilateral TPJ, along with temporal poles. Moreover, 
MPFC and precuneus activation were stronger for video clips where the actor was a close friend of 
the subject compared to clips where the actor was unfamiliar. Another one-sided interaction was 
proposed by Willems et al. (2010) in which participants were engaged in a communicative 
interaction through an interactive game (Taboo). The participant inside the MRI scanner generated 
verbal descriptions of target words without using predetermined ‘taboo’ words, while the other 
player outside the MRI scanner listened to these descriptions and guessed the target word. 
Interestingly, manipulating communicative intent, that is, changing whether the listener already 
knew the target word or not, and linguistic difficulty, influenced activation patterns in different 
brain regions. Most importantly, while MPFC activation was sensitive to the communicative 
intention manipulation, irrespective of linguistic difficulty, activation of the left IFG was sensitive 
to manipulations of linguistic but not of intention demands. These findings critically converge with 
the assumption of independence between ToM and communicative means processing adopted in our 
IPN model. 
Finally, a recent and interesting study of one-sided communicative production (Kuhlen et al. 
2017) examined the preparatory neural activity associated with the intention to speak, in the 
seconds that preceded a communicative exchange. The study analysed two distinct conditions of 
speech production: in one, participants thought a conversational partner would hear them, in 
another, the speech production was a technical calibration in which a conversational partner was 
absent. Results showed that the activity of the MPFC and ventral prefrontal cortex (bilaterally) was 
the only brain activation that differentiated the two conditions, specifically encoding the intention to 
speak with a conversational partner. 
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Two-sided interaction: the two-brain approach 
A novel neuroimaging approach to the study of neural correlates of intention processing in 
communication is what Konvalinka and Roepstorff (2012) have called the two-brain approach (see 
also Chatel-Goldman et al. 2013), an interactive approach in which the fMRI setting involves a two-
person interaction. These authors distinguished two paradigms, online and offline interaction: the 
first one uses a simultaneous recording of brain activity from both interactive partners at the same 
time (also known as hyperscanning, see Montague et al. 2002), whereas the second one recorded the 
two partners one after another.  
Unfortunately, almost all studies that have recently adopted this two-brain approach have 
tested non-social or non-communicative exchange, for example, joint attention during eye contact 
(Saito et al. 2010), or a task that required simply observing the sender’s emotional facial expression 
(Anders et al. 2011), as well as economic exchange (King-Casas et al. 2005). Not surprisingly, these 
studies reported brain activation outside the ToM system. To the best of our knowledge, only two 
studies used the two-brain approach with real interactive communicative situations, both in offline 
interaction: one with communicative gestures (Schippers et al. 2009) and one using language 
(Stephens et al. 2010, but see also Gordon, Rigon, Covington, Voss, & Duff, 2019). Schippers et al. 
(2009) used an interactive paradigm that represents a communicative interaction situation, such as 
playing charades. In this game, participants were presented with a word on the screen and instructed 
to communicate this word to a partner using gestures. Activation in a combination of MNS and 
ToM brain areas was found. Stephens et al. (2010) examined the brain activity of a speaker telling a 
story related to a personally relevant experience and the brain activity of a listener listening to a 
recording of the story. These authors found a spatial and temporal coupling between production and 
comprehension across speakers’ and listeners’ brains during this kind of verbal communication. 
This neural coupling during communication was observed at different levels, including production-
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based areas (e.g. Broca’s area), comprehension-based areas (e.g. Wernicke’s area), and, most 
importantly, ToM areas (e.g. the precuneus, TPJ, and MPFC).  
Once again, taken together, these results represent strong evidence of the role of the IPN in 
communicative intention processing in both linguistic and gestural modalities. 
 
Convergent lesion and neurodegenerative evidence for the IPN model 
Neuroimaging evidence seems to support the role of ToM regions of the IPN model as a neural 
substrate for the pragmatic comprehension of a speaker’s intended meaning. Nevertheless, it is 
important to note that while neuroimaging techniques provide relevant information about the 
involvement of a brain area in a given task, they are silent with respect to whether the brain 
structure is necessary for the task. Sufficient and necessary neural systems can only be identified by 
an iterative approach that integrates functional imaging studies of normal subjects with lesion and 
neuropsychological models provided by neurologically damaged subjects. Thus, the 
neuropsychological approach plays an important role in complementing functional imaging 
techniques and in testing theoretical hypotheses about cognitive architecture (Rorden and Karnath 
2004). In the following sections we examine independent, and most importantly, convergent 
evidence for the IPN model, deriving from patients with neuropsychological and neurodegenerative 
pathological conditions that affect ToM brain regions. 
 
Lesion studies 
Few studies have analysed how lesions in prefrontal regions affect intention processing in 
communication. One of the first studies (Lee et al. 2010) found that people with MPFC lesions 
show specific deficits in inferring speaker intentions using the Faux-pas Test, that is, 
communicative situations where a speaker says something he or she should not have said. 
Differentiating patients with traumatic brain injury to the prefrontal cortex (PFC) into dorsolateral 
and ventromedial groups, Geraci et al. (2010) found that both groups performed equally poorly on 
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the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test, which presentation via photographs of human eye regions 
permits assessment of the affective component of ToM, but only patients with ventromedial lesions 
performed poorly on the Faux-pas Test. According to these authors, both the dorsolateral and 
ventromedial PFC play an important role in interpreting social information encoded in the eye 
region, but only the ventromedial PFC plays a key role in the inferential components of intention 
attribution. Finally, Roca et al. (2011) analysed intention and multitasking processing on patients 
with lesions to the rostral PFC, that is, the Brodmann Area 10, and found that deficits in 
multitasking were specifically related to the extent of damage in the right lateral part, while deficits 
on the Faux-pas Test were related to damage of this brain area in general.  
 Other convergent evidence comes from patients with lexico-semantic impairments, such as 
in aphasia. These patients present profound language impairments with extensive damage to the 
traditional frontotemporal language network, but without specific ToM deficits (see Willems and 
Varley 2010, for a review). For example, Varley and Siegal (2000) reported the case of S.A., a 
patient with severe agrammatic aphasia but with preserved ToM reasoning, tested with false-belief 
tasks, that is, tasks that required the attribution of different orders of false beliefs. This dissociation 
was also reported by Varley et al. (2001), who discussed the case of M.R., a patient with impaired 
performance in linguistic tasks but preserved ToM reasoning, and by Apperly et al. (2006), who 
described the case of. P.H. in which severe agrammatical aphasia did not prevent this patient from 
solving non-verbal first-order and second-order false-belief tasks. Accordingly, using alternative 
communicative resources, such as drawing, facial expressions, and gestures, these patients were 
able to appropriately convey quite sophisticated communication contents (Siegal and Varley 2006; 
Varley and Siegal 2000). If language is crucially involved in communicative intention generation, 
aphasic patients should not perform well on pragmatic tasks. However, patients with aphasia 
exhibited communication strategies that were comparable to those observed in the neurologically 
healthy population (Willems et al. 2011). Thus, patients with aphasia show evidence of 
independence between ToM and grammatical abilities as ToM reasoning in communicative 
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contexts is possible even when specific grammatical constructions are impaired (Fontana et al. 
2018).  
 
Neurodegenerative studies 
An interesting domain of research in communicative intention processing is neurodegenerative 
conditions that mainly affect the ToM brain regions (Adenzato et al. 2010; Adenzato and Poletti 
2013; Cavallo et al. 2011b; Pezzati et al. 2014; Poletti et al. 2012). The behavioural variant of 
frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD) is the most frequent clinical form of frontotemporal lobar 
degeneration and the medial frontal cortex was identified as the brain region mainly affected in 
bvFTD (Schroeter et al. 2008). An interesting and novel area of research in bvFTD is the analysis of 
inference processes in communication, such as pragmatic and intention processing (Kipps et al. 
2009; Shany-Ur et al. 2012; Spotorno et al. 2015). Impairment in the comprehension of insincere 
communication, such as sarcasm and lie processing, has been found in patients with bvFTD 
compared to both patients with Alzheimer’s disease and healthy controls (Kipps et al. 2009; Shany-
Ur et al. 2012). In particular, Shany-Ur et al. (2012) found that patients with bvFTD, compared to 
healthy controls, failed to comprehend the intentions behind insincere speech, as in deception and 
sarcasm. A brain imaging analysis specifically linked the bvFTD patients’ sarcasm impairment to 
atrophy in the medial and lateral orbitofrontal cortex (Kipps et al. 2009). Further support derives 
from the study of Spotorno et al. (2015), who found impairment in processing of pragmatic 
inference, such as scalar implicature. These authors pointed out a deficit in patients with bvFTD in 
producing alternative interpretations beyond a logical reading, and linked this deficit particularly to 
atrophy in ventromedial PFC.  
In a recent study, Carotenuto et al. (2018) found a specific association between pragmatic 
abilities and functional connectivity of the ToM brain areas in patients with multiple sclerosis. 
These authors suggested that disruption of the neuronal network encompassing the bilateral TPJ and 
MPFC might underlie pragmatic breakdowns in these patients. Similar results were found by 
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Broicher et al. (2012) in patients with mesial temporal lobe epilepsies compared with patients with 
epilepsy not originating within the frontal or mesial temporal lobe, as well as with healthy controls. 
Performance on the Faux-pas Test significantly differed among groups, but performance in the 
Reading the Mind in the Eyes did not. Moreover, patients with mesial temporal lobe epilepsies were 
impaired in the Faux-pas Test compared to healthy controls, but not compared to extra-mesial 
temporal lobe epilepsies patients (whose performance lay between that of healthy controls and 
mesial temporal lobe epilepsies patients). Finally, Cavallo et al. (2011a) used a paper-and-pencil 
version of the comic strip task previously adopted in fMRI settings by our group, in patients with 
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, a clinical condition closely related to fronto-temporal dementia (Bigio 
et al. 2003). Compared to healthy controls, worse performance was found on tasks requiring 
comprehension of social intentions, such as communicative intentions, in these patients, but 
comparable performance on tasks requiring comprehension of non-social intentions.  
 
Convergent brain stimulation evidence for the IPN model 
Different studies have used brain stimulation techniques, such as repetitive transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (rTMS) and transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS), to analyse the role of ToM 
brain areas in communication in clinical and non-clinical populations.  
Brain stimulation techniques have gained increasing interest in the field of cognitive 
neuroscience as they are non-invasive and painless tools that allow researchers to induce transient 
alterations of normal brain activity in a relatively restricted area of the brain and thus produce 
transient functional lesions without actual damage to neural structures. The behavioural effects 
produced by these transient functional lesions allow researchers to better comprehend the causal 
role of a brain area in a specific cognitive function (Marini et al. 2018). 
Costa et al. (2008) investigated the effect of inhibitory rTMS over the MPFC and right TPJ 
during performance of the false-belief and the Faux-pas Test, and found significantly worsened 
accuracy in inferring speaker intentions in the Faux-pas Test. Schuwerk et al. (2014) showed that 
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posterior MPFC inhibition through rTMS impaired the ability to distinguish another’s from one’s 
own perspective, a component of ToM reasoning (but for different findings see Krause et al. 2012). 
rTMS over the ventral MPFC was used by Lev-Ran et al. (2012) to test whether normal functioning 
of this brain region is necessary for ToM functioning, and showed that rTMS did not induce a 
general learning deficit, but rather a specific learning deficit associated with ToM.  
Other studies found that altering cortical excitability in the right TPJ could crucially 
influence ToM abilities of healthy participants. Young et al. (2010) reported that inhibitory TMS to 
the right TPJ led participants to rely less on an actor’s mental states, which then affected their 
intention processing. An important effect was shown in particular in judging attempted harm (e.g. 
actors who intended but failed to do harm) when asked for a moral evaluation of an act of violence, 
that led participants to judge attempted harms as less morally forbidden and more morally 
permissible. Mai et al. (2016) showed that accuracy of both intention and emotion processing 
decreased after tDCS on right TPJ. Finally, an interesting and recent study on deceptive production 
performance, that is, deceiving another participant to obtain monetary rewards, reported that tDCS 
over the right TPJ of the performer induced a significant decrease in the rate of successful 
deception, indicating that cortical stimulation of this region influence deceptive performances 
(Noguchi and Oizumi 2018). 
Two recent studies applied tDCS to the frontal regions of the IPN model in patients with 
different neurodegenerative conditions, such as bvFTD and Parkinson’s disease (Adenzato et al. 
2019; Cotelli et al. 2018, but see also Adenzato et al., 2017 for ToM sex differences in healthy 
population). Cotelli et al. (2018) applied tDCS over the MPFC to selectively enhance ToM 
processing in patients with bvFTD using a communicative task previously adopted in fMRI settings 
by our group. In the placebo condition, a specific impairment in communicative intention 
processing was found in the bvFTD group compared to healthy controls. Interestingly, significant 
and selective accuracy improvement in the comprehension of communicative intentions after tDCS 
on MPFC was observed in patients with bvFTD. Recently, Adenzato et al. (2019), used tDCS over 
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the MPFC in patients with Parkinson’s disease with mild cognitive impairment and found that ToM 
performance was worse in the patients’ group than in the healthy controls group and that tDCS over 
the MPFC enhanced ToM performance only in the patients’ group. 
 
Discussion 
The pragmatic approach to the understanding of an other’s action that has emerged in recent years 
emphasizes the role of ToM in the attribution of social intentions. Such approach focused the 
analysis on the why of an action in a specific context. Similarly, Cognitive Pragmatics analyses the 
ability to reconstruct the why of a communicative action within a specific social context, namely 
communicative intention processing. In recent years, we proposed an IPN model according to 
which four key brain areas of the ToM system, that is, the MPFC, right and left TPJ, and precuneus, 
are fully engaged for intention processing in communicative contexts. In the present work we 
provide neuroimaging, lesion, neurodegenerative, and brain stimulation evidence demonstrating the 
key role of the ToM system in processing communicative intention. Different authors, such as 
Sperber and Wilson (2002), have converged on the idea that within the ToM network, a specialized 
sub-module has evolved which is dedicated to the pragmatic comprehension of communicative 
intentions, with its own proprietary concepts and mechanisms. In a narrow sense, we do not propose 
a specific ToM sub-module, because all the brain regions of the IPN are core areas of the ToM 
system. Nonetheless, in a wide sense, our model details a network of brain areas with its own 
principles and mechanisms, that is, a system differentially engaged according to the complex 
intertwining of the context, goal, and action involved. A further significant aspect emerging from 
the findings discussed herein is that engagement of the IPN does not depend upon the 
communicative means used, that is, written language, auditory language, or gesture. From a 
Cognitive Pragmatics view, the information acquired by different communicative modalities is 
equivalent from a mental processing standpoint, particularly when a communicative intention has to 
 27 
be reconstructed: hence, communicative intention processing may utilize different sources of 
information to infer the speaker’s intended meaning (Bara 2010; Enrici et al. 2011). 
Different important aspects remain open to discussion and are of potential interest for future 
research on the role of ToM brain regions as a pragmatics/cognition interface in communication. In 
the current study, we primarily analysed evidence concerning how the ToM system is recruited by 
intention processing in communication. How the other two main social neurocognitive systems, that 
is, social perception and action observation, are recruited in communicative contexts remains open 
to a more in-depth analysis. Although some studies have already explored comprehension of signals 
that convey either an intention to communicate or attempts to engage in a communicative 
interaction, thus linking the ToM with the social perception system, further investigation of the 
specific interplay amid the three systems in communication is needed. Interestingly, Yang et al. 
(2015) recently proposed the pSTS as the crucial region set at the intersection of the three overall 
systems, because this region is anatomically and functionally linked to the brain regions that 
implement these three systems. Our findings concerning the involvement of the IFG regions in 
processing communicative intention, regions mainly associated with the MNS, add new evidence to 
Yang’s proposal and shed new light on the role of these regions as crucial gateways between the 
action observation system and ToM system.  
A second issue worth discussing is whether the IPN is specific to communicative intention 
attribution or it has a more general application to different mental states attribution. Different 
studies report activation of nodes of the IPN beyond communication, such as the attribution of 
belief (e.g. through the false-belief task) or comprehension of affective mental states (e.g. through 
the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task) (see Carrington and Bailey 2009; Schurz et al. 2014). Future 
investigations will clarify how the ToM system could be differently engaged in the comprehension 
of distinct mental states processing. For example, a recent study by Koster-Hale et al. (2017) 
distinguished between epistemic (such as belief) and motivational (such as intention) components of 
ToM processing, showing a spatial and functional dissociation between epistemic features of 
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another person’s mental states, represented in the right TPJ, and its motivational valence, 
represented in the ventral part of the MPFC. As noted by Schaafsma et al. (2015) the current 
definition of ToM abilities does not permit easy downward translation to more basic neural 
processes such as those studied by social cognitive neuroscience, leaving the interpretation of 
neuroimaging results opaque. Accordingly, these authors argue for deconstruction and 
reformulation of ToM into a comprehensive set of basic cognitive components (see also Butterfill 
and Apperly 2013). From our perspective, deconstructing the ToM system could be a useful 
procedure to identify the role of ToM processing in different contexts and cognitive domains, and 
we suggest that communicative intention processing should be considered as a basic cognitive 
component and included in the reformulation, at least regarding its pragmatics/cognition interface 
role. 
A third significant topic of discussion is the progressive recruitment of ToM brain areas 
proposed in our IPN model. Neuroimaging findings discussed earlier provide robust evidence for 
the full involvement of the IPN in the elaboration of communicative intentions, but less stringent 
evidence about the restricted recruitment of the IPN for private intentions (i.e. the precuneus and 
right TPJ) and for prospective social intention (i.e. the precuneus and right TPJ, plus the MPFC). 
Few studies have used experimental paradigms that critically compare communicative vs. private 
intentions. For example, Egorova et al. (2016) analysed the neural correlates of speech acts in which 
the same critical utterances were used with a communicative partner in different communicative 
contexts, that is, to name objects or to request them. Their results showed that requesting an object 
from a partner activated the right pSTS and left IFG, as well as premotor and inferior parietal 
regions, whereas naming them engaged the left angular gyrus of the posterior parietal cortex. The 
crucial point here is that no IPN core areas were reported. This apparent falsification of our model is 
easily explained by noting that both conditions required communicative intention processing. In our 
model, the MPFC, right and left TPJ, and precuneus were activated when comparing the 
communicative scenario to private or non-intentional scenarios (i.e., social vs. non-social 
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situations). When two communicative scenarios are compared, both with two agents engaged in a 
communicative interaction (e.g., requesting an object vs. requesting the name of it), as in Egorova et 
al. (2016), the common brain areas of a specific system, such as the IPN, do not emerge, as a 
consequence of the common functional role of these brain area in both experimental conditions. 
Finally, it is important to underline that neuroimaging studies that have used specific comparative 
conditions, such as those of Sassa et al. (2007), Spotorno et al. (2012), van Ackeren et al. (2012), 
and Stephens et al. (2010), reported activation equivalent to that predicted by our IPN model. 
Considering the involvement of communicative, private as well as prospective social scenarios in 
conceiving the experimental paradigm remains a crucial aspect for the progressive recruitment of 
ToM. 
In the prospective social intention of our IPN model, we consider the relation between 
something that will presumably happen in the future and something happening in the present. This 
form of intention underlines the importance of the prediction dimension in which the potential 
social value of an ongoing action, such as, buying a gift, is anticipated. This topic links intention 
processing with the role of prediction in communication. In recent years, Pickering and colleagues 
(Pickering & Gambi, 2018; Pickering & Garrod, 2013) proposed a predictive approach to explain 
the rapid human processing of language. According to these authors, in language processing, 
humans may not only analyse each word as they encounter it, but also predict what they are going 
to encounter (Pickering & Gambi, 2018). In a similar way, ToM could be considered relevant in 
prediction at the pragmatic level, since ToM is frequently considered as the ability not only to 
understand but also to predict action based on attribution of mental states in an ongoing interaction 
(Heil et al. 2019; Koster-Hale and Saxe 2013). Koster-Hale and Saxe (2013) discussed how 
predictive coding could be applied to ToM processing, examining, in particular, the ToM brain 
regions included in our IPN model. According to these authors, predictive coding posits that ToM 
neural responses contain information not about the value of a currently perceived stimulus, but 
about the difference between the stimulus value and the expected value. This could be particularly 
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informative for ToM processing in every context in which the literal and the intended meanings, 
that is, the stimulus value and the expected value, do not correspond. Moreover, according to ToM 
predictive coding proposed by Koster-Hale and Saxe (2013), ToM neural responses to more 
predictable inputs are generally reduced, whereas they are usually enhanced to less predictable 
ones. Evidence examined herein seems to converge with this approach: ToM neural responses are 
enhanced precisely in those pragmatic conditions in which the stimulus value and the expected 
value do not match. Further evidence on the role of the IPN in communicative prediction is 
provided by the previously discussed findings of Stephens et al. (2010), who examined a real two-
sided communicative interaction using a two-brain approach. Interestingly, these authors found that 
linking the extent of the speaker-listener neural coupling to a quantitative measure of story 
comprehension, that is, the communicative content of the communicative exchange, revealed that 
the greater the anticipatory coupling, the greater the understanding. They argued that the observed 
alignment of communicative production and comprehension-based processes serves as a mechanism 
by which brains convey (and predict, in our perspective) communicative information. 
In general, we assume that predictions in dialogue are straightforward, a simplified version 
of what is going to happen in concrete situations, where the partner may say or do something that 
has not been predicted. Real life is more complex than abstract schemes of interaction, and it 
requires full activation of the IPN network. 
 
Conclusion 
In the present work, we discussed a theoretical model describing a set of brain areas differently 
involved in the comprehension of different types of intention, that is, the IPN model. According to 
this model, we should expect progressive recruitment of four key brain regions of the ToM system 
(i.e. left and right TPJ, precuneus, and MPFC) in the comprehension of private, prospective, and 
communicative intentions. Although literature investigating the neural correlations of different 
types of intentions is still scarce, our findings are congruent with the reported activations of ToM 
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regions in comparable tasks and with theories dedicated to explore the subtleties of the temporal 
dimension. Independent and converging evidence we presented from neuroimaging experiments, 
neuropsychological observations and brain stimulation studies support the hypothesis of the 
recruitment of a specific brain network. No surprise from a theoretical point of view: intentions, 
especially communicative intentions, are the heart of communication, which in turn is a core feature 
of human interpersonal dimension, for dealing with the social brain is evolved. Our final claim 
therefore is that the IPN has to be considered an essential constituent of a revised ToM system. 
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1. Signal time course for the three experimental conditions, private, prospective social, 
communicative intention, and for a non-intentional control condition (physical causality established 
among objects) relative to rest for the IPN brain regions. The brain picture depicts the contrast 
communicative intention versus physical causality condition showing the progressive recruitment of 
the four regions of interest, i.e., the precuneus, right TPJ, MPFC, and left TPJ. Time courses were 
calculated by averaging across conditions within each participant (red curve for communicative 
intention, violet curve for prospective social intention, green curve for private intention, and blue 
curve for physical causality). The pink area represents the story phase and the grey area represents 
the choice phase of the comic strips task. Adapted from Ciaramidaro et al. (2007) with permission 
from the publisher. 
Medial prefrontal cortex = MPFC; PREC = precuneus; Temporoparietal junctions = TPJ 
 
Figure 2. (A) In red, brain areas involved in both linguistic and extralinguistic communicative 
intention conditions, including the four ToM brain regions of the IPN model, i.e., MPFC, left TPJ, 
right TPJ, precuneus. In blue, brain areas involved in physical causality conditions established 
among objects (a non-intentional control condition) represented by both linguistic (the causal link is 
described by a sentence) and extralinguistic (the causal link is depicted in the scene) modalities. (B) 
In green, brain areas involved in processing linguistic communicative modality, including the left 
IFG. In yellow, brain areas involved in processing extralinguistic (gestural) communicative 
modality, including the right IFG. Adapted from (Enrici et al. 2011) with permission from the 
publisher. 
Inferior frontal gyrus = IFG; Intention processing network = IPN; Medial prefrontal cortex = 
MPFC; Temporoparietal junctions = TPJ; Theory of mind = ToM. 
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Figure 3. (On the top) Schematic view of the brain regions included in the effective connectivity 
models. The four ToM brain regions included in the IPN model, i.e., MPFC, left TPJ, right TPJ, 
PREC, in dark grey. The linguistic and gestural input gateways, i.e., the LIFG in blue and the RIFG 
in green. (On the bottom) Schematic connectivity architecture with the significant random-effects 
parameters of the optimum model. Blue lines indicate stronger direct input (thick arrows) or 
modulatory (thin arrows) effects induced by linguistic input. Green lines indicate stronger direct 
input effects induced by gestural input. Adapted from (Tettamanti et al. 2017) with permission from 
the publisher. 
Intention processing network = IPN; Left inferior frontal gyrus = LIFG; Medial prefrontal cortex = 
MPFC; PREC = precuneus; Right inferior frontal gyrus = RIFG; Temporoparietal junctions = TPJ; 
Theory of mind = ToM. 
 



